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What You Don’t Have Can’t Leak—Or Be Blown Up by Terrorists
Mon, 15 Dec 2008 17:55:00
By Paul Orum
In New York and across the country there are manufacturers, water utilities and other chemical facilities that threaten surrounding communities with the possibility of a catastrophic toxic gas release. New York alone has some 120 facilities that each threaten at least 1,000 nearby residents.
According to the Department of Homeland Security and numerous security experts, terrorists might view facilities like these as attractive targets and attempt to use industrial chemicals as pre-positioned weapons.
The good news is that this threat can be substantially reduced. Many high-hazard chemical facilities can convert to safer and more secure chemicals or processes that remove the possibility of a catastrophic release.
Unfortunately, current temporary federal chemical facility anti-terrorism standards, set to expire in October 2009, are fundamentally flawed. In particular, these standards:
• Exclude water utilities, which together endanger millions of people;
• Don’t hold companies accountable for chemicals they ship or receive—arguably the most vulnerable point in the supply chain; and
• Make no structured effort to remove unnecessary chemical targets.
A recent report I authored for the Center for American Progress, “Chemical Security 101,” identified alternatives that could remove the most dangerous chemicals from most of the nation’s 101 highest-hazard chemical facilities—including sites in New York and New Jersey that endanger millions of New Yorkers. These alternatives could remove such dangers from bleach plants, water utilities, paper mills, petroleum refineries and a variety of manufacturers.
For example, since 2001, a number of New York water utilities have converted from chlorine gas to liquid bleach, removing the danger of a gas release to workers and surrounding communities. These utilities include drinking water plants in Poughkeepsie and Auburn and wastewater plants in Buffalo, Utica, Lackawanna, Angola and Niagara Falls. The Niagara Falls Wastewater Treatment Plant formerly endangered 1.1 million people before it converted from rail shipments of chlorine gas.
Other New York facilities continue to pose unnecessary dangers. The Surpass Chemical Company Bridge Street Plant in Albany produces liquid bleach from chlorine gas received by rail. An accident or attack on this facility threatens more than a half million people. A similar bleach producer, JCI Jones Chemicals in Warwick, endangers over one million. These facilities could manufacture bleach without ever storing or shipping chlorine gas, as other facilities do already.
Thus far, the chemical industry has fended off any requirement to evaluate and develop safer, more secure alternatives. Instead, the Department of Homeland Security is focused on physical site security, such as guards and gates. Plant site security, however important, may fail and does nothing to protect Americans from chemicals shipped over railroads and highways. Safer, more secure technologies remove the hazard altogether.
Converting to alternatives is often cost-effective. A prior survey by the Center for American Progress found that a third of some 225 facilities that had converted to safer and more secure alternatives expected to save money, and half did not anticipate an increase in costs. Some 87 percent of the facilities converted for less than $1 million.
Approximately four dozen water utility plants in New York still use large amounts of chlorine gas. The $300 million or more spent each day on the war in Iraq—ostensibly looking for weapons of mass destruction—could instead easily convert these facilities to safer, more secure alternatives, such as liquid bleach, ozone and ultraviolet light, as appropriate.
Federal action may be on the horizon. This year, the U.S. House Homeland Security Committee voted out a comprehensive chemical security program in H.R. 5577, a likely starting point for deliberations in 2009. As Senators, both Barack Obama and Joe Biden sponsored legislation to remove unnecessary chemical hazards through safer and more secure technologies.
In order to generate effective solutions, any chemical security program should require chemical facilities to review alternatives that can reduce or remove the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The program should involve employees in security planning and inspections, and include sufficient administrative transparency to ensure government accountability.
A federal program also should not preempt the right of states to set more protective standards—something the Bush Administration asserted under the current temporary standards until Congress intervened. One state, New Jersey, currently requires chemical facilities to assess safer and more secure alternative technologies. New York could take similar steps if the federal government fails to act.
If a chemical facility endangers its neighbors, it is reasonable and attainable for the facility to review and use practicable alternatives that remove the danger. What you don’t have can’t leak—or be blown up by terrorists.
Paul Orum is the author of “Chemical Security 101,” a recent report prepared for the Center for American progress.
In New York and across the country there are manufacturers, water utilities and other chemical facilities that threaten surrounding communities with the possibility of a catastrophic toxic gas release. New York alone has some 120 facilities that each threaten at least 1,000 nearby residents.
According to the Department of Homeland Security and numerous security experts, terrorists might view facilities like these as attractive targets and attempt to use industrial chemicals as pre-positioned weapons.
The good news is that this threat can be substantially reduced. Many high-hazard chemical facilities can convert to safer and more secure chemicals or processes that remove the possibility of a catastrophic release.
Unfortunately, current temporary federal chemical facility anti-terrorism standards, set to expire in October 2009, are fundamentally flawed. In particular, these standards:
• Exclude water utilities, which together endanger millions of people;
• Don’t hold companies accountable for chemicals they ship or receive—arguably the most vulnerable point in the supply chain; and
• Make no structured effort to remove unnecessary chemical targets.
A recent report I authored for the Center for American Progress, “Chemical Security 101,” identified alternatives that could remove the most dangerous chemicals from most of the nation’s 101 highest-hazard chemical facilities—including sites in New York and New Jersey that endanger millions of New Yorkers. These alternatives could remove such dangers from bleach plants, water utilities, paper mills, petroleum refineries and a variety of manufacturers.
For example, since 2001, a number of New York water utilities have converted from chlorine gas to liquid bleach, removing the danger of a gas release to workers and surrounding communities. These utilities include drinking water plants in Poughkeepsie and Auburn and wastewater plants in Buffalo, Utica, Lackawanna, Angola and Niagara Falls. The Niagara Falls Wastewater Treatment Plant formerly endangered 1.1 million people before it converted from rail shipments of chlorine gas.
Other New York facilities continue to pose unnecessary dangers. The Surpass Chemical Company Bridge Street Plant in Albany produces liquid bleach from chlorine gas received by rail. An accident or attack on this facility threatens more than a half million people. A similar bleach producer, JCI Jones Chemicals in Warwick, endangers over one million. These facilities could manufacture bleach without ever storing or shipping chlorine gas, as other facilities do already.
Thus far, the chemical industry has fended off any requirement to evaluate and develop safer, more secure alternatives. Instead, the Department of Homeland Security is focused on physical site security, such as guards and gates. Plant site security, however important, may fail and does nothing to protect Americans from chemicals shipped over railroads and highways. Safer, more secure technologies remove the hazard altogether.
Converting to alternatives is often cost-effective. A prior survey by the Center for American Progress found that a third of some 225 facilities that had converted to safer and more secure alternatives expected to save money, and half did not anticipate an increase in costs. Some 87 percent of the facilities converted for less than $1 million.
Approximately four dozen water utility plants in New York still use large amounts of chlorine gas. The $300 million or more spent each day on the war in Iraq—ostensibly looking for weapons of mass destruction—could instead easily convert these facilities to safer, more secure alternatives, such as liquid bleach, ozone and ultraviolet light, as appropriate.
Federal action may be on the horizon. This year, the U.S. House Homeland Security Committee voted out a comprehensive chemical security program in H.R. 5577, a likely starting point for deliberations in 2009. As Senators, both Barack Obama and Joe Biden sponsored legislation to remove unnecessary chemical hazards through safer and more secure technologies.
In order to generate effective solutions, any chemical security program should require chemical facilities to review alternatives that can reduce or remove the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The program should involve employees in security planning and inspections, and include sufficient administrative transparency to ensure government accountability.
A federal program also should not preempt the right of states to set more protective standards—something the Bush Administration asserted under the current temporary standards until Congress intervened. One state, New Jersey, currently requires chemical facilities to assess safer and more secure alternative technologies. New York could take similar steps if the federal government fails to act.
If a chemical facility endangers its neighbors, it is reasonable and attainable for the facility to review and use practicable alternatives that remove the danger. What you don’t have can’t leak—or be blown up by terrorists.
Paul Orum is the author of “Chemical Security 101,” a recent report prepared for the Center for American progress.
