Cops Can Be Reckless Drivers Like Anyone Else

Ayers v. O’Brien

Decided by: Court of Appeals, Dec. 17, 2009

On July 31, 2005, as Broome County Deputy Sheriff Marc Ayers drove his patrol car in the Town of Chenango, he noticed a speeder heading in the opposite direction. In the middle of a U-turn to pursue the speeder, Ayers’ car was sideswiped by James O’Brien.

Ayers filed a personal injury lawsuit against O’Brien for negligent driving. In responding to the allegation, O’Brien asserted that Ayers’ too was negligent in making a U-turn without notice, so the damages should be limited. Ayers then moved to dismiss this defense, citing New York’s Vehicle and Traffic Law, which frees emergency workers from negligence suits. Generally, police and firefighters are considered privileged drivers and can only be sued when their conduct behind the wheel amounts to “reckless disregard” for others. After the trial court granted Ayers motion, the Appellate Division reversed and requested the Court of Appeals consider the matter.

In a unanimous opinion, the state’s highest court held that the privilege for emergency workers “cannot be used as a sword to ward off a comparative fault defense.” Judge Eugene Pigott wrote the trial court’s reasoning would “result in significant unfairness” as windfall recoveries could occur when an officer is injured primarily through his own fault.

Moreover, the Court said the Legislature never intended to give “emergency vehicle operators greater freedom to disregard the rules of the road while undertaking their responsibilities,” as a contrary result would. The ruling keeps emergency workers on par with all other drivers in lawsuits. But it still will not stop the sheriff or other officers from writing tickets.

Lead Chips In The Hallway Are As Bad As Lead Chips In The Apartment

Charette v. Santspree

Decided by: Appellate Division, 3rd Department, Dec. 31, 2009

In May 1998, Tracey Charette discovered her two-year-old child Amber had elevated level of lead in her blood. She sued both the old and new owners of her building, claiming her child was poisoned by lead paint in her apartment walls.

The landlords moved to dismiss the claims because they had no notice of lead in the walls or peeling paint—to establish liability, Charette had to establish their knowledge. However, given that the apartment was private and there had not been any previous complaints by Charette, the defendants argued that was an impossible task.

The Appellate Division in Albany disagreed, so long as there was lead in the paint in the common areas of the building. Although the defendants denied ever seeing paint chip anywhere in the building, Charette stated that she had seen it fall in a common area near a front hallway.

The decision, although a reasonable extension of the principle of constructive notice, could place an onerous burden on landlords statewide to speculate about conditions in specific apartments based on the conditions of high-traffic common areas.

Unlike Guns, Sex Offenders Are Part Of Interstate Commerce

United States v. Hall

Decided by: Second Circuit Federal Court, Jan. 8, 2010

The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) is a federal law requiring convicted sex offenders to register their whereabouts in their state of residence and keep that registration current. This federalization of state law registration requirements posed a problem for David Hall. Following a May 2006 conviction, Hall was required to register in New York. However, a year later, when state officials sent a registration verification to his address, the form was returned. Hall had moved to Charlottesville, Va., and did not return to New York until February 2008.

When Hall did return to Auburn, N.Y., officials contacted the Charlottesville Police and learned that Hall had not registered there. The United States Attorney indicted Hall under the SORNA for his failure to register in Virginia. Hall moved to dismiss the indictment, saying the SORNA exceeded Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause, because his movements had no connection to interstate commerce.

Federal Judge David Hurd of Utica agreed with Hall, finding that the registration requirement had no substantial links to interstate commerce. Notably, similar reasoning was used by the Supreme Court to strike down a federal law prohibiting gun possession within 1,000 feet of a school as well as part of the Violence Against Women Act.

Sidestepping Hurd’s decision, the Second Circuit reversed the decision and reinstated the indictment against Hall. The appeals court said that the provision must be read in light of its broader purpose and in conjunction with other parts of the same Congressional act. Tracing a history of Congressional enactments on sex-offender laws, the court found a substantial link to interstate commerce. Still, the sidestepping leaves a lingering uncertainty about Congress’ power to mingle in state criminal law.